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INCOME SHIFTING
INCOME SHIFTING THROUGH A SUBCHAPTER
S CORPORATION*
INTRODUCTION
A reduction in a family's overall federal income tax liability can
frequently be accomplished by shifting income from high to low bracket
family members. Under general tax principles, if a taxpayer transfers title to
property to a donee, the income from that property is thereafter taxed to the
donee.1 Thus, in the corporate context, a high bracket shareholder might
transfer title to some of his stock to his low bracket child in an attempt to
insure that future income from the stock will thereafter be taxed to the child.
A Subchapter S corporation is a particularly useful vehicle for achieving
this goal. This Comment will examine the basic advantages of using the
Subchapter S format, and explore in some detail the pitfalls that must be
avoided in order to make the best use of a Subchapter S income splitting
arrangement.
WHY INCOME SPLITTING IS MORE EFFECTIVELY
ACHIEVED UNDER A SUBCHATER S FORMAT
THAN A SUBCHAPTER C FORMAT
A. General Income Shifting Considerations
The goal in an income splitting scheme is to transfer to a low bracket
taxpayer income that would have been taxed to a high bracket taxpayer. In
a Subchapter S corporation, gains escape taxation at the corporate level and
are taxed immediately to the shareholders, whether or not they are in fact
distributed to the shareholders. 2 This direct flow of gains to the shareholders
makes a Subchapter S corporation a very effective means of shifting income.
For example, a father in the fifty percent bracket 3 who owns all of the stock
of a Subchapter S corporation that earns $80,000 net income while paying
the father a reasonable salary of $20,000, will be taxed a total of $50,000. If,
on the other hand, he transfers one-half of the stock to his son, a twenty
percent taxpayer, the total taxes paid will be $38,000, computed as follows:
the father is taxed $30,000 (fifty percent of $40,000 net earnings and $20,000
of salary), and the son is taxed $8,000 (twenty percent of the $40,000 net
earnings to which his stock ownership entitles him). Thus, $12,000 can be
saved through this simple stock transfer.
In a Subchapter C corporation, the transfer of stock to a low bracket
taxpayer may not yield such noticeable tax savings. In this type of
* The author would like to thank Professor Robert I. Keller for his great
assistance in the preparation of this Comment.
1. See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
2. See I.R.C. § 1373(a), which states that "[tihe undistributed taxable income of
an election [Subchapter S] corporation for any taxable year shall be included in the
gross income of the shareholders of such corporation . ..."
3. For the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed that all tax rates mentioned in
this Comment are the marginal rates of the respective taxpayers.
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corporation, there are potentially two levels of taxation - one at the
corporate level and one at the shareholder level. Although the net earnings
will always be taxed at the corporate level, they are not taxed to the
shareholders until they are distributed in the form of dividends. 4 Withhold-
ing the immediate distribution of dividends to the taxpayers may actually be
better tax planning than the allocation of stock to lower bracket holders
followed by the payment of dividends, because the payment of dividends
creates an immediate ordinary income tax liability that would not otherwise
exist. If the earnings are instead kept inside the corporation until the shares
are redeemed or sold, or until the corporation is liquidated, the taxpayer and
his transferees will be taxed at the lower capital gains rate.5 This strategy
would also provide a deferral of the tax liability to the shareholders.
Of course, if for some non-tax reason, the stockholders of a Subchapter C
corporation desire the distribution of some or all of the corporate earnings,
the allocation of stock to lower bracket family members will result in some
tax savings. The preceding discussion merely illustrates that such a
distribution forces the payment of a double tax when only the corporate tax
liability is necessary. In contrast, a Subchapter S corporation involves only
one level of immediate taxation, so the possibility of accumulating profits to
obtain capital gains treatment and deferrals is not a viable alternative.
B. Allocation of Salary as an Income Shifting Device
It has generally been held that earned income cannot be assigned to
another taxpayer.6 However, under a Subchapter S format the allocation of
earned income to a low bracket taxpayer might be accomplished if a high
bracket shareholder-employee reduces his salary after having transferred
some of his stock to a low bracket taxpayer. The salary reduction makes
available more corporate earnings that can then be allocated to low bracket
shareholders, thereby lowering the total tax liability.
For example, if a father who is a fifty percent taxpayer and his son, who
is in the twenty percent bracket, each own one-half of a Subchapter S
corporation's stock, and the corporation earns $80,000 net income and pays
the father a salary of $20,000, the total tax liability of father and son would
be $38,000. If, on the other hand, the father reduces his salary by $10,000, he
simultaneously raises the corporate earnings by $10,000, and half of this
gain is allocated to the son. As a result, the total taxes are reduced to $36,500
- $27,500 paid by the father, and $9,000 by the son.
This salary reduction device does not result in such tax savings in a
Subchapter C corporation. If the father and son are each fifty percent
4. Section 11 of the Internal Revenue Code states that "[a] tax is hereby imposed
for each taxable year on the taxable income of every corporation." When the net
earnings of a corporation are distributed to the shareholders as dividends, they are
taxed to the shareholders. I.R.C. § 61(7). Thus, the corporate earnings distributed as
dividends are subject to a double tax, except for the first $100 of dividends of domestic
corporations which are excluded from the taxpayer's income under § 116 of the Code.
5. See I.R.C. §§ 302, 1222, and 331 as to tax treatment of redemptions, sales, and
liquidations respectively.
6. See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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shareholders in a corporation taxed at a rate of forty-eight percent, a $10,000
salary reduction would lower the father's tax bill by $5,000, but would
increase the corporation's income by $10,000, producing an additional
corporate tax liability of $4,800. Thus, there would be only a relatively small
tax savings resulting from the reduction of salary because the reduction of
the father's personal tax is almost completely offset by the increase in the
tax levied on the corporation. 7 If the remaining $5,200 is then distributed to
the father and his son, each will pay an income tax on the dividend for a
total tax of $6,620 on the salary redistribution ($1,820 income tax plus $4,800
corporate tax).
The advantages of using the Subchapter S corporation as a vehicle for
family income splitting are thus apparent, but it must be noted that this tax-
planning strategy is subject to two important judicial and statutory
constraints. The first constraint is the requirement that the stock transfer be
bona fide; the second involves the use of sections 1375(c) and 482 of the
Internal Revenue Code to limit the manipulation of salary in an income-
splitting scheme.
MAINTAINING THE BONA FIDES OF THE STOCK TRANSFER
In order to achieve the desired income splitting under a Subchapter S
corporation, it is necessary to insure that the transfer of stock will be treated
as a bona fide gift by the courts. Otherwise, the income distribution plan will
fail if challenged by the Internal Revenue Service.
The landmark Supreme Court decision in Helvering v. Clifford8
established the rule that the party who controls an asset will be taxed on the
income arising from it, despite his attempts to shift the ownership of that
income. 9 In Clifford, the grantor created a trust for the benefit of his wife
that was to terminate at the end of five years, at which time the corpus
would be paid over to the grantor as remainderman. The grantor also
appointed himself the sole trustee with exclusive powers to sell, exchange,
mortgage or pledge any of the trust property, to reinvest the property or the
income therefrom, and to compromise any claims held by him as trustee. In
addition, an exculpatory clause purported to protect him from all losses
except those occasioned by his own wilful and deliberate breach of duties as
trustee.10
7. Of course, if the corporation were taxed at a lower rate there would not be the
almost complete offset illustrated by this example. However, the fact that there is, in
the Subchapter C situation, a separate corporate tax on salary not taken by the high
bracket taxpayer, means that more taxes will be paid in the Subchapter C situation
than when a Subchapter S corporation is used. Therefore, the income-shifting effect of
the reduction in salary will be less in a Subchapter S corporation.
8. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
9. For a general discussion of Helvering v. Clifford and the tax consequences of
short term, revocable and irrevocable trusts, see Note, The Income Tax on Short Term
and Revocable Trusts, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1322 (1940); Note, Irrevocable Trusts and the
Federal Income Tax, 49 YALE L. J. 1305 (1940).
10. 309 U.S. at 332-33.
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On these facts the Court held that the grantor, not his wife, was the
owner of the trust and hence taxable on the trust income, stating that "the
short duration of the trust, the fact that the wife was the beneficiary and the
retention of control over the corpus by the [taxpayer] lead irresistibly to the
conclusion that [the taxpayer] continued to be the owner" of the trust
property." The Court further stated that the trust was
at best a temporary reallocation of income within an intimate family
group. Since the income remains in the family and since the husband
retains control over the investment, he has rather complete assurance
that the trust will not effect any change in his economic position ...
[W]hen the benefits flowing to him directly through the wife are added
to the legal rights he retained, the aggregate may be said to be a fair
equivalent of what he previously had. 12
The principle enunciated in Clifford is directly applicable to the question
of who is the proper party to be taxed on the earnings of a Subchapter S
corporation. When a taxpayer transfers legal title in corporate stock to a
family member but still retains the true "economic ownership" of the stock,
he, not the transferee, will be taxed on any earnings attributable thereto. In
such a situation, the Service and the courts will look to the substantive
realities of the transferor's control of the stock despite the transferee's
nominal ownership. On the other hand, when the transferor parts with the
real benefits of stock ownership rather than just the bare legal title, the
transferee will be held to be the proper party to bear the burden of taxation.
The necessity of a bona fide stock transfer in the Subchapter S context has
been codified by a Treasury Regulation that states:
A donee or purchaser of stock in the [Subchapter S] corporation is not
considered a shareholder unless such stock is acquired in a bona fide
transaction and the donee or purchaser is the real owner of such stock.
The circumstances, not only as of the time of the purported transfer but
also during the periods preceding and following it, will be taken into
consideration in determining the bona fides of the transfer. Trans-
actions between members of a family will be closely scrutinized. 13
Three major United States Tax Court decisions have dealt with the
question of the bona fides of a stock transfer under a Subchapter S
corporation. The first such case was Duarte v. Commissioner,4 a case in
which the taxpayer operated a business supplying temporary office personnel
as well as several office-related services. At the time of incorporation, all of
the stock was issued to the taxpayer. The taxpayer transferred twenty-five
percent of the corporation's stock to each of his two children and shortly
thereafter the corporation elected to be taxed as a Subchapter S corporation.
11. Id. at 335.
12. Id. at 335-36.
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(a)(2) (1960).
14. 44 T.C. 193 (165).
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The taxpayer's wife, the mother of the stockholding children, was then
appointed as custodian of the children's shares. 15 Shortly thereafter, the
corporation, in an apparent attempt to split some of the income generated by
the corporation, reduced the taxpayer's salary from $30,000 per year to
$15,000 per year. In addition, although the records showed that nearly all of
the $100,000 of corporate income had been distributed proportionately to the
shareholders, no money had ever been received by the children, and the
taxpayer could not satisfactorily explain what happened to the money. In
fact, no custodial accounts had been opened for the children, and although
tax returns were filed for the children by the parents, the taxes were paid out
of the taxpayer's checking account.1 6 On these facts the court found that the
purported transfers of stock to the two children lacked economic reality.
Because neither the children nor their mother (as custodian of their shares)
had any influence in the operations of the corporation, and because the
taxpayer-father was thus the true economic owner of all of the stock, all of
the corporation's income was taxed to the father.17
The second Tax Court case in this area was Beirne v. Commissioner.'8
In Beirne, the taxpayer formed a corporation and issued thirty percent of its
shares to each of his three children, retaining ten percent for himself. When
a fourth child was born to the taxpayer, he gave that child a proportionate
interest in the company equal to that of his other children by requiring the
older children to donate a portion of their shares to the newly born child.
The taxpayer's wife was named custodian of the children's shares, and
shortly thereafter a Subchapter S election was made. During the period from
1960 to 1965, the corporation earned about $130,000. Although the children
each year reported taxable income equal to their proportionate holdings in
the corporation, the only distributions actually made to the children's bank
accounts by the corporation were for the payment of their income taxes. On
the other hand, the taxpayer-father, ostensibly a ten-percent shareholder,
received over $72,000 in unsecured advances from the corporation during the
same period.19
In ruling that all of the income earned by the corporation was taxable to
the taxpayer-father, the court followed Duarte, reasoning that the transfers
lacked economic reality. As it did in Duarte, the Tax Court first noted that
there was no evidence that either the children or their mother as custodian,
had any influence in the affairs of the corporation. Their complete lack of
influence was viewed by the court as strong evidence that the petitioner
controlled the company. 20 Moreover, the manner in which the father
readjusted the children's stock holdings when the new child was born - his
ability to direct the children to transfer their shares to the new child -
15. Id. at 194-95.
16. Id. at 195-96.
17. Id. at 197.
18. 52 T.C. 210 (1969).
19. Id. at 211-15.
20. Id. at 218-19.
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further convinced the court of the taxpayer's continued control of the
shares. 21
Finally, the opinion focused on the disposition of the corporation's
earnings. As previously stated, of the $130,000 earned by the corporation in
the tax years in question (1960-1965), only $22,000 was distributed to the
children - and these distributions were made only for the payment of their
income taxes. The bulk of these earnings, $72,000, was borrowed by the
taxpayer for his personal use. These loans were unsecured and the taxpayer
made only erratic repayments. By 1965 only $17,000 of the $72,000 had been
repaid, and as the court noted, the manner of repayment of the principal and
interest was less than bona fide. For example, the taxpayer partially repaid
the unsecured advances by transferring to the corporation notes of
questionable value that were issued by a financially troubled corporation of
which he was a major stockholder. In another instance, the taxpayer
financed an interest payment by borrowing the funds from the corporation.
The court thus concluded that the taxpayer had no genuine intention of
repaying the advances he obtained from the corporation. Because the
taxpayer was reaping the benefits of complete corporate ownership without
bearing the full burden of taxation, the court taxed all of the corporation's
income to him.12
The third case decided by the Tax Court in this area, Kirkpatrick v.
Commissioner,23 exemplifies a successful shifting of income among family
members in a Subchapter S corporation. In Kirkpatrick, the taxpayers
apparently were aware of Duarte and Beirne, and fashioned the arrange-
ment so as to avoid the errors made by the taxpayers in those cases and
thereby prevent a finding that the stock transfers lacked economic reality.
The plaintiffs in Kirkpatrick were a husband and wife who had
originally owned all of the corporation's stock, but gave ten percent of the
stock to each of their three children. Three years later a fourth child was
born to the taxpayers and he was also given ten percent of the corporation's
stock out of the stockholdings of the parents. The mother was made
custodian of the children's shares.2 4 Although the children's proportionate
share of corporate income from 1967 to 1972 was about $195,000, none of this
was distributed to them. Instead, these funds were distributed in large part
to the taxpayer-father who used them to purchase real estate and to
construct a building to house the corporation's principal offices, warehouses,
and plant facilities. Other corporation proceeds were used to acquire real
estate investments for the corporation. 2'
21. Id.
22. Id. at 219-20. In Beirne v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 268 (1973) ("Beirne II"), the
Internal Revenue Service determined that there were additional income tax
deficiencies for 1965 to 1967. Because it found the salient facts unchanged since the
earlier decision, the court extended the taxpayer's full tax liability for the
corporation's income through 1967. Id. at 277.
23. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1122 (1977).
24. Id. at 1123.
25. Id. at 1124.
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Promissory notes for each of the children were prepared for the principal
amount of their distributive shares of the corporation's 1967 to 1972 income,
plus interest thereon, less the taxes paid on behalf of the children as a result
of their reporting their shares of the taxable income from the corporation.
These notes were secured by the taxpayers' shares of the corporation's stock,
and were made payable to the mother as custodian for each of the four
children. The petitioners financed the interest payments by borrowing from
a local bank, and by the time of trial, $95,000 of the $195,000 principal and
interest on the notes had been repaid.
26
The children's custodian, their mother, had a very significant role in the
company. As an officer and director, she was involved in all major corporate
decisions. Moreover, because she wrote all of the checks for the company,
she was aware of each withdrawal made by her husband, and was thus in a
position to protect the interests of the children-shareholders. 27 The court in
Kirkpatrick ultimately found that the children's stock ownership for the
years in question did not lack economic substance, and in contrast to Duarte
and Beirne, held that part of the income earned by the corporation during
those years was taxable to the children according to their proportionate
shares of the corporation's stock.28 In reaching this decision, the Tax Court
compared the facts in Kirkpatrick with those in Duarte and Beirne, focusing
on four factors. The court's discussion of these factors greatly clarifies what
it regards as a bona fide stock transfer that will be sustained as an income
distribution device.
The first factor was whether the custodian was capable of exercising
enough influence in the corporation to protect the interests of the children
who were shareholders. The court noted that in Duarte and Beirne the
custodians did not exercise any influence in the corporation and distin-
guished the case before it on the ground that the record showed that Mrs.
Kirkpatrick exercised considerable influence over the affairs of the
corporation - she "was an active custodian" quite capable of protecting the
interests of her children. 29
The second factor considered was whether the taxpayer-father exercised
complete dominion over the corporate stock. In deciding that the father
never controlled the ownership of his children's stock once it had been
transferred to them, the court carefully distinguished its prior decision in
Beirne. When the father in Beirne wanted to give some shares of the
corporation to his newborn child, he caused each of his minor children to
relinquish twenty-five percent of their stock. The Kirkpatrick court viewed
this fact as strong evidence that Mr. Beirne had "retained the effective right
to transfer ownership of stock in [the corporation] whenever and to
whomever he desired," 3 and noted that when the Kirkpatricks wanted to
transfer the ownership of stock in their corporation to their newborn child,
they used their own stock and did not "alter or dilute the proportionate
26. Id. at 1123-24.
27. Id. at 1124.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1126.
30. Id. at 1127.
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ownership theretofore enjoyed by their other children." 31 Consequently, the
court had no difficulty in concluding that Mr. Kirkpatrick did not exercise
complete dominion and control over his children's shares.
A third factor, whether the father retained the economic enjoyment of
the benefits of ownership of the children's stock by failing to distribute
corporate earnings to the children, was also relied upon in distinguishing
Duarte and Beirne. In Duarte, where the children did not receive any of the
money that the corporation reported as having been distributed to them, and
the taxpayer could not explain what had happened to that money; the
taxpayer had apparently appropriated his children's pro-rata share of
corporate earnings for his own purposes. He was therefore taxed on those
earnings. Similarly, in Beirne, the father, a purported ten-percent share-
holder, secured over one-half of the corporate earnings by borrowing on an
open account from the corporation for non-corporate purposes, and he was
held to have enjoyed the economic benefits of ownership of the children's
stock. In Kirkpatrick, the court recognized that the father received cash
distributions that represented a part of the children's share of undistributed
income, but did not believe that the father's actions deprived his children of
the economic enjoyment of owning their stock. The court stated that the
failure of the corporation to distribute the earnings to the children was not
significant, because the children were too young to make use of the money.
To determine whether the children received the actual enjoyment of the
corporate earnings for which they were taxed, the court looked at the use
made of the money and the manner in which the children's interests were
safeguarded. Mr. Kirkpatrick used the money to construct corporate
headquarters and to make corporate real estate investments. The court held
that this use of the corporate earnings "benefited the children by increasing
the overall worth of the corporation, since the children, as stockholders,
share in the corporation's increased net worth and profits."
32
Finally, the court viewed the fact that Mr. Kirkpatrick made out
promissory notes to the children's custodian in an amount equal to the
money due them, thereby acknowledging that the funds belonged to the
children rather than the taxpayer, as evidence of the economic reality of the
transfer. Although no such note was issued for one of the tax years in
question, the court held that in view of all of the facts the lack of the
promissory note did not bar the existence of the debt. Further, the taxpayers'
failure to establish bank accounts for their children was not viewed as
controlling.
In summary, it is evident that in setting out and analyzing the factors
that the Tax Court will scrutinize in deciding whether a transfer will be
upheld as bona fide, Kirkpatrick is a useful tax-planning guide to the
shifting of income in Subchapter S corporations. The court's emphasis of
each of the four factors demonstrates that the form of the transaction is
crucial to establishing the validity of the transfers, and it would appear that
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1127-28.
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strict adherence to the form used in Kirkpatrick will result in a "safe
harbor" for the taxpayer-transferor. On the other hand, it is unclear from
Kirkpatrick how much divergence from the form employed there will be
tolerated by the Tax Court. It is not clear, for example, whether a parent will
be able to make use of his children's funds for non-business purposes if
formal promissory notes are executed, or whether the custodian must be a
director or officer of the corporation to be deemed able to protect the
children's interests. These and similar questions will keep tax planners
guessing in this area for some time to come.
ESTABLISHING THE REASONABLENESS OF THE
TAXPAYER'S SALARY
In addition to being susceptible to an Internal Revenue Service attack
for not transferring the stock in a bona fide transaction, a taxpayer who
splits his income under a Subchapter S arrangement faces the danger that
the Service will attempt to reduce the income distribution effect by
redesignating a portion of the corporation's taxable income as salary of the
transferor. A taxpayer can maximize his income allocation under a
Subchapter S arrangement by reducing his salary, thereby raising the
corporation's earnings and increasing the allocation to the low bracket
taxpayers. 33 In an attempt to deal with this particular situation, section
1375(c) of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
Any dividend received by a shareholder from [a Subchapter S
corporation] may be apportioned or allocated by the Secretary ...
between or among shareholders of such corporation who are members of
such shareholder's family.. . if he determines that such apportionment
or allocation is necessary in order to reflect the value of services
rendered to the corporation.
If a court agrees with the need for reallocation, some or all of the corporate
income may be shifted back. into the transferor's higher tax bracket. Under
section 1375(c), the salary of a shareholder-employee may be raised to an
"amount that would ordinarily be paid in order to obtain comparable
services from a person not having an interest in the corporation. '34
Roob v. Commissioner35 was the first case decided under section 1375(c)
in which the Service's reallocation from dividend to salary was sustained by
the Tax Court. In that case, the taxpayer and his wife had elected
Subchapter S status for their photography business. They and their seven
children each owned equal amounts of the corporation's stock. The bona
fides of the stock transfers to their minor children was not challenged,
apparently because the income attributable to the children's shares was
distributed to the children's bank accounts. 36
33. See pp. 810-11 supra.
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-3(a) (1960).
35. 50 T.C. 891 (1968).
36. Id. at 892-93.
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Mr. and Mrs. Roob each earned $10,000 in 1962 and $12,000 in 1963 and
1964 while working full time for the corporation. During those years the
corporation earned and distributed to its shareholders a net income of
$9,429.71, $4,759.72, and $24,506.69, respectively. In asserting a deficiency,
the Commissioner stated that Mr. Roob's salary should be increased by
$4,000 in 1962, $5,000 in 1963, and $8,000 in 1964. This allocation obviously
caused a substantial decrease in the amount of income distributed to the
children through the corporation.37
In sustaining the Commissioner's application of section 1375(c), the
court relied on the same factors it would normally consider in determining
the reasonableness of salary under section 162(a)(1), which permits business
deductions based on "a reasonable allowance for salaries or other
compensation for personal services actually rendered": the nature of the
services performed, the responsibilities involved, the time spent, the size and
complexity of the business, prevailing economic conditions, compensation
paid by comparable firms for comparable services, and salary paid to
company officers in prior years.38 With respect to its determination of
reasonableness in accordance with these criteria, the court imposed the
following burden of persuasion on Mr. Roob:
In determining the correctness of [an] ... allocation [pursuant to
section 1375(c)] and the resulting deficiency, we must recognize that
respondent's determination carries with it a presumption of correctness
and that in order for petitioners to prevail, they must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the determination is incorrect. 39
In an attempt to meet this burden, the petitioner introduced a statistical
survey compiled by a professional photographer's society that purported to
indicate a percentage relationship between the owner's salary and sales of
several hundred portrait and commercial studio owners and operators. The
court dismissed the validity of this survey, however, because only a small
percentage of the photographers contacted actually participated in the
survey. 40 Without any other reliable evidence from which it could determine
the reasonableness of Mr. Roob's salary during the years in question, the
court felt compelled to sustain the IRS's section 1375(c) allocation.4
Rocco v. Commissioner,42 on the other hand, was a case in which the
taxpayers were able to convince the court that the amount of compensation
received from their Subchapter S corporations was fair and reasonable so
that a section 1375(c) adjustment was not permitted. Two taxpayers had
each formed separate Subchapter S corporations to manage certain
apartment buildings. Each taxpayer owned four percent of his corporation's
37. Id. at 894-95.
38. Id. at 898.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 900.
41. Id.
42. 57 T.C. 826 (1972).
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stock and worked about ten hours a week for his corporation. During the tax
year in question, each took an extended vacation in Florida. For their
services to their corporations, the taxpayers were paid salaries of $14,950
and $11,960 respectively, and had each received $12,000 for similar services
in the previous year.43
On these facts, the IRS sought to invoke section 1375(c), arguing that
the proper salary for such services should have been $35,000 per year for
each taxpayer, and sought to increase the taxpayers' burden of persuasion
from the preponderance of the evidence rule applied in Roob to a
requirement that they prove the Service's determination was unreasonable,
arbitrary, and capricious. This increased burden would have been similar to
the standard employed in determining reasonableness under section 482, 44
but the court did not reach the issue of the appropriate standard of proof,
deciding instead that the Service's allocation could not be upheld under
either standard. 45
In reaching this decision, the court noted the largely ministerial nature
of the taxpayers' responsibilities and the fact that only a few hours of
service were rendered each week. In addition, it gave weight to the testimony
of the taxpayers and their accountants that they could have hired competent
individuals who were not related to the corporation to perform these tasks at
less than half of the salary they received, and noted that the Service had
"presented no testimony to refute petitioners' evidence as to the amount that
would ordinarily be paid in order to obtain comparable services from a
person not having an interest in the corporation." 46 The court thus held that
the salaries received by the taxpayers fairly reflected the values of the
services they performed, and that the Service's allocation could therefore not
be sustained.47
As noted previously, the Tax Court in Rocco withheld any decision on
what burden of proof must be met in order to discredit the Commissioner's
section 1375(c) allocation. That is, it did not decide whether the taxpayer
must prove that the Commissioner erroneously allocated the salary by a
preponderance of the evidence, as in Roob, or whether he must prove, as he
must under section 482, that the Commissioner abused his discretion,48 a
higher standard of proof. If section 1375(c) is deemed to be an exclusive
section, that is, the only section of the Code that can be utilized in the
situation to which it applies, the determination of the proper burden of proof
may be critical in deciding the fate of many taxpayers. If, however, section
482 is held to be available to the Commissioner when his reallocation of
salary in a family-owned Subchapter S corporation is challenged, the fact
43. Id. at 827-30.
44. See text accompanying note 48 infra.
45. Id. at 832-33. The burden of proof question was also left open in at least one
subsequent case, Davis v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1034 (1975).
46. Id. at 833 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-3(2) (1960)).
47. 57 T.C. at 833.
48. See, e.g., Grenada Indus., Inc., 17 T.C. 231, 255 (1951), affl'd, 202 F.2d 873 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953).
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that a lower standard of proof is applied under section 1375(c) will be of little
consequence because the Commissioner will always be able to resort to
section 482's more favorable standard.
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether
or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and
whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion or allocate
gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such
organizations, trades or businesses, if he determines that such
distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to
prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such
organizations, trades, or businesses.
In the case of family income splitting through a Subchapter S corporation,
the corporation is normally the only business involved. Thus, on its face,
section 482 appears to be inapplicable because it speaks of "two or more
organizations, trades or businesses." Moreover, the legislative history of
that section indicates a Congressional intention to limit section 482's
coverage to cases in which there are two or more businesses. 49 If Congress
had intended to include individuals, the provisions could easily have
referred to "persons" instead of terms that do not literally or logically
include individuals. 5° Nevertheless, the Commissioner has repeatedly been
successful in his attempts to extend section 482's coverage to cases involving
a business and an individual between whom he hopes to effect a distribution
or allocation of income.5 1 Thus, the two-business requirement will often not
be a bar to the application of section 482.
There are two other preconditions, in addition to the two-business
requirement, to the application of section 482. The first is that the taxpayer
be in control of both "businesses." In the case of a Subchapter S corporation
this merely means that the taxpayer controls the corporation, as it must be
assumed that he controls himself. The other precondition is that the
allocation be necessary to clearly reflect income or to prevent the evasion of
taxes. In other words, the IRS must prove that the allocation is justified.52
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rubin v.
Commissioner 3 may shed some light on the question whether section 482
will be held applicable in cases to which section 1375(c) also applies. Stated
49. The House Ways and Means Committee stated, in its report, that the reason
for inserting the term "organizations" into § 482 was "to remove any doubt as to the
application of this section to all kinds of business activity." H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 (part 2) C.B. 554, 572 (emphasis added).
50. J. LEwis, ALLOCATIONS (SEC. 482) - GENERAL COVERAGE A-3 (BNA Tax
Mngm't Portfolio No. 327, 1978).
51. See, e.g., Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 933 (1969); Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), affl'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966).
52. I.R.C. § 482.
53. 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'g and remanding, 51 T.C. 251 (1968).
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briefly, the Service in Rubin argued that both sections 6154 and 482 require
that a corporation's controlling stockholder be taxed for the income owned
by his corporation. The Tax Court decided that the income was attributable
to Rubin under section 61 and therefore did not consider whether section 482
required a similar result.55 On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the Tax
Court erred in relying on section 61, rather than section 482. The court
reasoned that section 482 was much more clearly intended to deal with the
problem presented and concluded that "[r]esort to Section 482 is clearly
superior to the blunt tool [of Section 61] employed by the Tax Court. '56
It is quite conceivable that the analysis employed by the Second Circuit
in Rubin could be extended to preclude reliance on section 482 when section
1375(c) is also applicable.57 There can be no doubt that section 482 may be
characterized as a "blunt tool" when compared with the specificity of section
1375(c). While section 482 applies "in any case of two or more ... businesses
* . .owned or controlled directly ... by the same interests . . .," section
1375(c) applies only in the case of a family-owned Subchapter S corporation.
Moreover, section 1375(c) was enacted over thirty years after the enactment
of section 482,58 thereby, perhaps, evincing a Congressional intent that it,
rather than section 482, should govern the Commissioner's allocation in
family-owned Subchapter S corporations.
There is one situation in which very little doubt exists that the
Commissioner will be able to use section 482 to achieve an allocation of
salary from a Subchapter S corporation to a controlling shareholder.
Because section 1375(c) speaks only in terms of allocations among
shareholders, and there are no rules of constructive stock ownership
applicable to section 1375(c), that provision is apparently inapplicable when
the taxpayer has transferred all of his stock to family members. In such a
situation, section 482 should without question be applicable to insure a
"proper" allocation of salary.
54. I.R.C. § 61 is a broadly phrased section that defines income. This section
incorporates much of what has been called the common law of taxation. See Brown,
The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 235 (1961). In Rubin,
the Commissioner relied on § 61's incorporation of the Lucas doctrine which states
that income is taxed to the true earner thereof. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
55. 51 T.C' 251 (1968), rev'd and remanded, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970).
56. 429 F.2d at 653.
57. It should be noted, however, that the Tax Court has apparently rejected the
reasoning of the Rubin court in certain circumstances. In Fogelsong v. Commissioner,
35 T.C.M. 1309 (CCH) (1976),the court employed "the so-called 'common law' doctrine
of assignment of income and section 61" to a situation in which § 482 could have been
applied. In so doing, the court recognized that in Rubin the Second Circuit held that
the use of § 61 "is inappropriate where there is a specific statutory provision, namely
section 482, adequate to deal with the problem." Id. at 1312 n.2. Because Fogelsong
was not appealable to the Second Circuit, the court refused to shift the basis of its
holding from § 61 to § 482.
58. Provisions similar to § 482 were contained in Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 45,
52 Stat. 474. I.R.C. § 1375(c) was enacted in 1958.
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CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that a properly structured stock allocation plan can
yield large tax savings to a family that controls a Subchapter S corporation.
To have a plan in which the transfers will be deemed valid by the courts, the
formal requirements of Kirkpatrick should be followed as closely as possible.
In addition, the salary taken by the controlling shareholder should be
comparable to compensation paid by similar firms for similar services, to
avoid a section 1375(c) allocation. Because it is not certain which burden of
proof will be imposed upon the taxpayer in the section 1375(c) situation, it
would seem advisable to plan for the worst and assume that the harsher
section 482 burden will be applied in any such action.
